

Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic

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The historical consensus is that logic is special in some sense. For example, that logical laws are both formal and general in a way that other laws are not, and that logical knowledge is immediate and non-inferential in a way that other knowledge is not. Yet, it is now recognised there are significant problems facing logical exceptionalism, due both to general philosophical concerns over apriori sources of evidence, and exceptionalism's failure to accommodate actual logical practice. In response to these concerns, logical anti-exceptionalism proposes that the special nature of logic and its laws have been significantly exaggerated. In this masterclass we provide an overview of the debate between exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism: we outline the ways in which logic has historically been considered special, explain how past and current versions of anti-exceptionalism challenge this view, and discuss the challenges facing anti-exceptionalism.