

Title: Connecting norms and ideality in semantics for deontic logic

Abstract. When we do deontic logic, our main aim is to come up with logical systems suitable to capture normative concepts, like those of prescription and permission. Standard deontic logic models these concepts in terms of ideality, where what is deontically ideal depends on specific philosophical intuitions. Typically, in doing so, we do not explicitly consider norms and their connection with the ideal. This means that in standard deontic logic we cannot represent phenomena like the enforcement of a norm, the reference of a norm to another norm, or the fact that a norm is satisfied. In this talk, I present a logic of norms, **LN**, obtained by combining resources offered by explicit modal logic [Fitting 2005; Artemov 2008] and standard deontic logic. This system is designed to address some of the most serious issues logics of norms face, including the following: how can we account for the fact that norms direct rather than describe? How can we represent norms as consisting of prescriptions in conditional rather than categorical form? Can we model the fact that only enforced norms are sources of obligation? Is there a relation between norms and ideality? After showing how **LN** answers these questions, I argue that this logic provides us with a fruitful framework, first, to assess norm-induced operations of generation of outputs given inputs and, second, to analyse contrary to duty situations and compensatory norms. (This is a joint work with Alessandro Giordani)