1. The challenge of antirepresentationalism
I take into consideration what has been regarded by the supporters of radically embodied cognitive science (RECS) as the strongest argument against the computational-representational paradigm in cognitive science, namely, the impossibility of having a scientifically appropriate (= naturalized) notion of content. I will argue that the argument is not correct because cognitive science needs not to be committed with naturalization of content.

2. Rethinking psychologism? The case of language understanding
I test the previous conclusion in a particular case: the ability of understanding language. I show that the best way to assess a computational theory of language understanding does not involve indeed the naturalization of content. I argue that this question is related to an underestimated problem: finding a formulation of a cognitive theory of language understanding able to resist classical antipsychologist arguments.

3. Computationalism: A pyrrhic victory?
I argue that, even if computationalism can resist the challenge of antirepresentationalism, still it faces hard problems that lead to put in question its explanatory value. We are far from understanding the mind, both on the metaphysical aspect (question of the mark of the mental) and the epistemological aspect (question of how mind should be studied).