Brice Halimi (Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense)
Frege's model theory

Discussing Frege’s "logical universalism," I claim that the universality of logic (the fact that logical truths purport to be about everything) and the radicality of logic (the fact that logic precedes any other theory) ought to be distinguished. Drawing on a suggestion in Frege’s "Foundations of geometry" (1906), I then argue, contra Wilfrid Hodges and William Demopoulos, that Frege can make sense of the notion of non-logical constant, and that Tarski’s semantics is but one implementation of Hilbert’s concept of reinterpretation of a formal theory. A formal framework, based on the modern tool of fibrations, is set out to substantiate this point.

Marco Panza (IPHST Paris 1) & Andrea Sereni (IUSS Pavia)
Frege’s Constraint and its Relation to Frege’s Logicism

The recent debate on Fregean and Neo-Fregean philosophy of mathematics has given much attention to what has been called "Frege's Constraint", or "Applicability Constraint". Roughly, Frege's Constraint requires that an explanation of actual and potential applications of a mathematical theory or a given system of numbers be somehow rooted into the very definitions of the relevant numbers. The constraint can be traced back to some of Frege's views on natural numbers as well as to his criticism to Cantor's and Dedekind's definitions of the real numbers. We investigate different theoretical roles that a constraint on definitions akin to Frege's Constraint may be intended to play in a philosophical account of mathematics, and suggest that different readings of this general constraint seem suitable to Frege's definitions of the naturals and the reals, respectively. We then explore the motivations and consequences of these alternative readings, showing how they support different conceptions of Fregean logicism when natural or reals are concerned.

Francesca Boccuni (University San Raffaele, Milan) – Jack Woods (Bilkent University, Ankara)
What should we render unto Caesar?

We tackle the so-called Julius Caesar (JC) problem for Neo-Fregeanism. The problem is that Hume's Principle (HP), Frege's way of carving out the cardinal numbers, does not distinguish between objects of different sorts. HP says that the number of Fs is the same as the number of Gs if and only if F and G are equinumerous – i.e. the Fs and the Gs can be put into 1-1 mapping. This causes the JC problem: in Frege's provocative example, how can we know that the reference of “the number of the rooms in Palazzo del Broletto”, as specified by HP, picks out the cardinal number n instead of Julius Caesar? We will suggest a solution to this vexed problem in terms of the arbitrary reference. We argue that introducing the tool of arbitrary reference does not undermine the logical character of Hume's Principle since arbitrary reference satisfies the correct formal criterion of logicality----``invariance", in the right sense, under isomorphism. In effect, we argue that we should render unto Julius Caesar only what is Caesar's...and unto #(x = Julius Caesar) only what is 1's.
Sébastien Gandon  
*Analysis and meaning in Russell and Moore*

One could easily believe that certain theory of meaning forbids the very possibility of an analysis. Moore and Russell's early view according to which the meaning is a definite entity that one is acquainted with when one understands a phrase is a case in point. In this framework, it seems that either we understand a proposition, and then we understand it clearly -- or we don't understand it at all. The intermediate stage that can be taken as the starting point for an analysis is lacking. In my talk, I intend to show that this reading is false. Relating Moore’s theory of meaning with Sidgwick methodological breakthrough, I will show that Moore’s theory of meaning is a weapon against the attempt to ground philosophical principles on meaning postulates.

Agustin Rayo (MIT)  
*The word is the totality of facts, not of things*

I argue for a facts-first conception of reality, according to which facts are more fundamental than objects.