

IUSS Philosophy Seminars
L&PIC – Linguistics and Philosophy IUSS Center

Epistemology & Mathematics Series

18/01/23

IUSS, Sala Del Camino, Palazzo Broletto
14.00-16.00 CET

Giacomo Melis (University of Stirling)
Brute errors and warranting roles (of experience)

Taking the lead from the discussion of various cases of epistemic defeat of an ordinary perceptual warrant, I distinguish between brute errors and cognitive failures. I go on to consider the difference between factors that play enabling roles and factors that play warranting roles in an agent's warrant, and I suggest that brute errors always affect what plays the warranting role. I then focus on a priori warrants and, using the framework sketched in the first part of the paper, I conjecture that a priori warrants are immune to brute errors. I will conclude by discussing the significance of the suggestion for the traditional claim that a priori warrants are, in some sense, epistemically superior to empirical ones.