

**IUSS Philosophy Seminars  
L&PIC – Linguistics and Philosophy IUSS Center**

**Epistemology & Mathematics Series**

**28/02/2023**

**IUSS, Sala Del Camino, Palazzo Broletto  
14.00-16.00 CET**

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Comparative Beliefs and Imprecise Credences**

**[abstract]**

Degrees of belief are typically thought of as numerical. However, it's not clear what degrees of belief actually are - we don't literally have little numbers attached to our beliefs. I argue for a comparativist account of belief which claims that an agent's comparative belief relations are primitive and real and can explain numerical degrees of belief. A major appeal of comparativism is that comparative beliefs are more psychologically plausible, it is natural to talk about an agent simply lacking comparative beliefs between two propositions.

There are several challenges comparativism must address including whether we can have interpersonal beliefs, explain how we can get ratio information and how to model irrational agents. I address these questions and show how in addressing them we are pushed towards accepting an intersectionist interpretation of imprecise credences.