

Titolo: **Strong Acquaintance Exists**

Abstract: Many philosophers claim that we bear a relation of acquaintance to certain items of experience, such as pains, itches, shapes, and colors. However, these philosophers don't all understand acquaintance--what it is or consists in--in the same way. Some only posit a relatively weak form of acquaintance whereby one is acquainted with something if and only if one is aware of it and one's awareness of it is not mediated by awareness of anything else. Others posit a stronger form of acquaintance, claiming that our awareness of certain things is unmediated, not just by *awareness* of anything else, but by any inference, judgment, conceptualization, causal process, or other knowledge. In this chapter, I will argue that this relatively strong form of acquaintance exists. To make my case for strong acquaintance, I'll draw on and develop the implications of a very old notion: *skeptical doubt*. I'll argue that, in some cases, we can't doubt that our experiences exist, and that from this we can infer that we are strongly acquainted with our experiences and, thus, that strong acquaintance exists. I will also extend this argument to other—even stronger—forms of acquaintance and thus argue that they exist as well. My goals in this chapter are twofold: To clarify the notion of acquaintance by identifying various forms that it can take, and to argue that these forms of acquaintance exist.