Bounded Rationality, Imperfect Data, and Trust:
Perspectives from Social and Formal Epistemology

Abstracts

10.00-11.00 Chiara Lisciandra (MCMP, LMU Munich; University of Milan)
Explanatory Norms Across Disciplinary Boundaries

This paper provides resources from the philosophy of science to identify differences between explanatory norms across disciplines and study how such differences affect scientific collaboration. This research field has its roots in Humphreys' seminal work (2002) and its refinement in a series of publications (2004, 2019). The body of literature on explanatory norms is rapidly growing. However, there is still no consensus on a theoretical framework that allows us to identify explanatory norms across disciplines in a systematic manner. The aim of this paper is to provide such a framework and use it to i) identify explanatory norms across domains; and ii) predict patterns of collaborative work accordingly. By pursuing these goals, this work promises to be theoretically significant and practically relevant. It contributes to the work on domain-specific explanatory norms; and provides recommendations for science-policy analysis of interdisciplinary science.

11.00-11.15 short break

11.15-12.15 Francesco Nappo (Politecnico di Milano)
Can Kuhn and Bayes Meet?

In the first part of the talk, I will sketch an argument to the effect that, for reasons endemic to Kuhn's conception of scientific rationality, scientific revolutions are unlikely to display the strong forms of incommensurability that Kuhn famously ascribed to them. In the second part, I will move on to assess some arguments for the incompatibility of Kuhnian philosophy of science with popular versions of the Bayesian epistemological standpoint. My claim will be that, if there is any incompatibility between Kuhnian and Bayesian philosophy, it is not well captured by the incommensurability phenomena that are frequently depicted as being at the core of the disagreement between the two schools.

12.15-13.15 Colin R. Caret (Utrecht University)
Bounding Belief: the Problem of Logical Omniscience and the Value of Logical Modeling

The problem of logical omniscience for models of belief is often said to rest on idealized modeling assumptions. Real agents have limited resources. They cannot infer every implication of their beliefs. Models that predict logical omniscience simply ignore the realities of bounded agency. So the story goes.
In this talk, I will discuss the relationship between logical omniscience and bounded agency at an informal level as well as how this relationship impacts belief modeling.
First, I want to consider some foundational issues that are often glossed over. What kind of problem is logical omniscience? Is logic the best tool to deal with this problem? What outcome do we hope to achieve with our formal models of belief? Does the notion of bounded agency directly bear on this project and what direction does it point to?
Second, I want to consider some detailed proposals about how to improve formal models of belief. I introduce the problem of logical ignorance, which serves as a counter-point to logical omniscience. A popular idea is that models of belief should lie in between the two extremes. I discuss why this is also difficult. Some minimal conditions force us to one of two undesirable extremes. I consider whether this shows that the heart of

13.15-14.30 lunch

14.30-15.30 Michel Croce (University of Genoa)
Pseudo-Experts and the Credentials Problem

In the past decade, several major events involving science advice and institutional decisions provided the opportunity for an anti-expert sentiment to grow at a fast pace. However, available data collected by recent surveys across different countries show that in the last few years, there has not been any significant decrease in trust in experts. Why then do so many people share anti-expertise sentiments and attitudes if, in general, they claim they trust experts? It is argued that people adopt anti-expertise attitudes because they misplace their trust in experts. At its surface, the problem of misplaced trust takes the shape of embracing pseudo-scientific theories and falling prey to a wide range of impostors. But the crux of the problem is that people do so as they struggle to identify real experts and distinguish them from unreliable information sources. After analyzing a series of case studies, it is argued that extant solutions to the credentials problem in the epistemology of expertise fail to provide us with the resources to address the challenge posed by misplaced trust. Some criteria for revising extant lists of credentials are offered.

15.30-16.30 Tommaso Piazza (University of Pavia)
Epistemic Blame and Non-Ideal Epistemology

In this talk I defend an account of doxastic responsibility inspired by W. Alston and argue, in light of this account, that many consumers of disinformation can be held responsible and criticized, epistemically speaking, for being misled. I then tackle an objection based on the couple ideal/non-ideal epistemology that has been leveled against the above claim by R. Rini. According to Rini, the claim holds true only for epistemic angels, but is plainly false when we endeavor to assess the doxastic conduct of real-world epistemic agents. I agree with Rini that the social epistemology of epistemic angels would be a pointless intellectual exercise. However, I will argue that non-ideal consumers of disinformation, no less than their ideal counterparts, are often open to epistemic criticism.

16.30-16.45 short break

16.45-17.45 Anna-Maria A. Eder (University of Cologne)
Evidence and Value

Our lives become more manageable when we share our cognitive work with someone and learn from that person. In this talk, I will focus on the case where we learn from others by receiving evidence that others have evidence for a hypothesis (see also Feldman 2007 and, similarly, Hardwig 2007). While in earlier work, I focused on the evidential conditions under which one has evidence when one receives evidence that another person has evidence, in this talk, I want to focus on the extent to which non-epistemic, social, cultural, and moral, values play a role in answering the question of when evidence of others' evidence is evidence. To answer this question, I bring together debates from epistemology and philosophy of science.

Organizers:
Ludovica Conti (IUSS Pavia), Silvia De Toffoli (IUSS Pavia), Andrea Sereni (IUSS Pavia), Guido Tana (NOVA Lisbon).

In-person venue:
Scuola Universitaria Superiore IUSS, Aula Magna - Sala del Camino
Palazzo del Broletto, Piazza della Vittoria, 15, 27100 Pavia (PV)
Virtual venue:

https://iusspavia.zoom.us/j/81421394754

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